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Abstract
KLAIM is an experimental programming language that supports a programming paradigm where
both processes and data can be moved across dierent computing environments. This paper
presents the mathematical foundations of the KLAIM type system; this system permits checking
access rights violations of mobile agents. Types are used to describe the intentions (read, write,
execute, : : :) of processes relative to the dierent localities with which they are willing to interact,
or to which they want to migrate. Type checking then determines whether processes comply with
the declared intentions, and whether they have been assigned the necessary rights to perform
the intended operations at the specied localities. The KLAIM type system encompasses both
subtyping and recursively dened types. The former occurs naturally when considering hierarchies
of access rights, while the latter is needed to model migration of recursive processes. c© 2000
Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Network computing is calling for new programming paradigms and for new pro-
gramming languages that model interactions among clients and servers by means of
mobile agents; these are programs that are transported and executed on dierent hosts.
Security, i.e. privacy and integrity of data, is a key issue in the development of mo-
bile applications. One can easily imagine malicious mobile agents attempting to access
private information, or modifying private data. Hence, a server receiving a mobile
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agent for execution needs to impose strong requirements to ensure that the incoming
agent does not violate privacy and jeopardize the integrity of the information. Simi-
larly, mobile agents need tools to ensure that their execution at the server site does
not compromise their integrity or security.
Programming languages for mobile agents are based on policies (both at compi-
lation and run time) that restrict privileges and capabilities more than needed. This
may unnecessarily reduce the expressive power (and the capabilities) of mobile agents.
Moreover, it might not be obvious how to guarantee that certain desired security prop-
erties are enforced by the language implementation. More generally, there is a lack of
formal foundations to express and prove desired security properties of programs.
Recently, several researchers have explored the possibility of considering security
issues at the level of language design aiming at embedding protection mechanisms
in the languages. For instance, the language Java [7] exploits type information as a
foundation of its security: well-typed Java programs (and the corresponding veried
bytecode) will never compromise the integrity of certain data. In the area of functional
programming, type systems are successfully used to avoid programming errors (type
safety) by means of checks at compile time. Types are used to dene the notion of
well-behaved programs, and only programs that comply with the requirement of the
type system are executed.
In this paper we discuss the design of the security type system for KLAIM (a Kernel
Language for Agents Interaction and Mobility) [18], an experimental programming
language specically designed for programming mobile agents. KLAIM uses types to
protect resources and data and to express and enforce policies for access control. The
type system is used to guarantee that the operations that processes intend to perform
at various network sites comply with the processes’ access rights.
KLAIM supports a programming paradigm where programs can migrate from one
computing environment to another. The language consists of core Linda [22, 15] with
multiple located tuple spaces and of a set of process operators, borrowed from Milner’s
CCS [28]. KLAIM tuple spaces and processes are distributed over dierent localities,
which are considered as rst-class data. Linda operations are indexed with the loca-
tions of the tuple space they operate on. This allows programmers to distribute=retrieve
data and processes over=from dierent nodes directly. Programmers share their control
with what we call the net coordinators. Net coordinators describe the distributed infras-
tructure necessary for managing physical distribution of processes, allocation policies,
and agents mobility.
Let us now see how a system composed of a process Server and two identical
processes Client can be programmed in KLAIM . Afterwards, we shall see how types can
be used to specify and enforce access control polices. The server process is programmed
in KLAIM as follows:
Server def= out(l)@self:nil:
Server rst adds a tuple that contains the locality l (out(l)) to its local tuple space
(@self), then evolves to the terminated process nil. The client process is programmed
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as follows:
Client def= read(! u)@lS :eval(P)@u:nil:
Client rst accesses the tuple space located at lS to read an address u (read(! u)@lS ,
where ! u is a formal variable), then sends process P for execution at u (eval(P)@u),
nally evolves to nil.
A net coordinator might allocate Server on site s (this implies that self is bound
to s) and the two processes Client on sites s1 and s2. At both these sites, care is taken
that lS is bound to s; this allows clients to interact with the server.
KLAIM types provide information about the intentions of processes: downloading=
consuming a tuple, producing a tuple, activating a process, and creating a new tuple
space. We will use fr; i; o; e; ng to indicate the set of capabilities, where each symbol
stands for the operation whose name begins with it; r denotes the capability of execut-
ing a read operation, i stands for in, o for out, e for eval, and n for newloc. Semanti-
cally, types are functions mapping localities (and locality variables) into functions from
sets of capabilities to types. The KLAIM type system encompasses both subtyping and
recursively dened types. Subtyping naturally emerges when considering hierarchies of
access rights. Recursive types are used for dealing with mobile recursive agents.
The typing analysis of KLAIM programs is structured in two phases reecting the two-
level syntax of KLAIM . The rst phase deduces the intentions of processes relatively to
the dierent localities they are willing to interact with or they want to migrate to. This
is obtained by means of an inference system that statically assigns types to processes,
and checks whether processes behave in accordance with their declared intentions. All
rules of the system are syntax driven and such that for any process there exists a
minimal type smaller than all the types deducible for it.
The second phase statically checks whether each process has the necessary rights
to perform the intended operations, i.e. whether the process violates the access rights
as granted by the net coordinator. Capabilities are used dierently by processes and
net coordinators. The capabilities associated to a locality (or to a locality variable) ‘,
within a process type carry information about the operations the process intends to
perform at ‘. Net coordinators use capabilities to specify the access policy of each site
of a net in terms of access rights and execution privileges. In practice, net coordinators
statically decorate each node of a net by a unique type that codies the policy for
controlling access from that node to the other nodes of the net. A net is called well-
typed whenever, for any site, the types of the processes allocated on that site are not
greater than the type of the site.
The role of the two phases is illustrated by the client=server system described above.
If process P has type P , the outcome of the rst stage of typing analysis of Client is
the type
c = lS 7! frg 7!?; u 7! feg 7! P:
It states that Client intends to perform a read operation at locality lS and intends to
send a process with type P for execution at the locality denoted by u.
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Let us assume that the net coordinator grants the following access rights to the sites
s1 and s2 where Client is duplicated:
s1 = s 7! frg 7!?; u 7! feg 7! P; s2 = s 7! frg 7!?;
then only the process located at s1 has the right of sending processes with type P for
execution at u. Indeed, the net
s ::s[s=self] Client k s1 ::
s1
[s1=self; s=lS ]
Server k s2 ::s2[s2=self; s=lS ] Server
where s is the type of site s, is not well-typed.
By relying on static typing and dynamic type checking, we prove that well-typedness
is an invariant of the operational semantics (subject reduction) and that well-typed nets
are free from run time errors caused by misuse of access rights (type safety). Dynamic
type checking is necessary because the creation of new sites modies the types of the
other sites of the net and is useful for controlling (typed) data exchange.
This paper provides the mathematical foundations of the KLAIM type system. Its main
technical contribution is a subject reduction theorem and a type safety theorem. We
also prove the decidability of the type system and provide an algorithm to compute
types of processes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the syntax and
the informal semantics of KLAIM processes, types and nets. Section 3 denes type
equality and the subtyping relation, while Section 4 denes the type inference system
for deriving process types and introduces the notion of well-typed net. Section 5 denes
the operational semantics of KLAIM processes and nets. Section 6 states and proves the
subject reduction theorem and the type safety theorem for our type system. Section 7
contains a few programming examples. For the sake of readability, detailed proofs of
syntactical properties of the type system are postponed to Section 8. The nal section
contains comparisons with related work and hints for further research.
2. Klaim and its informal semantics
KLAIM consists of a core Linda with multiple tuple spaces and of a set of operators,
borrowed from Milner’s CCS [28]. A distinguishing feature is that tuples and operations
over them are located at specic sites of a net and types are used to control access rights
of processes over these sites. We start this section by summarizing the main features
of Linda (the interested reader is referred to, e.g., [23, 16, 15] for more details). Then,
we present the syntax of KLAIM (processes, types and nets).
Most of the presentation of the untyped part of the language is borrowed from [18].
There, we also outline the main features of the KLAIM type system without providing
the actual syntax for types, the explicit notion of run time error and the proofs of the
subject reduction theorem and of the type safety theorem.
Linda is a coordination language that relies on an asynchronous and associative
communication mechanism based on a shared global environment called tuple space
(TS). A tuple space is a multiset of tuples, that are sequences of actual elds, i.e.
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expressions or values, and formal elds, i.e. variables. Pattern matching is used to
select tuples in a TS. Two tuples match if they have the same number of elds and
corresponding elds have matching values or variables; variables match any value of
the same type, and two values match only if they are identical. Linda provides just
four main primitives for handling tuples: two (non-blocking) operations add tuples to
a TS, two (possibly blocking) operations access tuples in the TS.
The Linda asynchronous communication model allows programmers to explicitly con-
trol process interactions via shared data and to use the same set of primitives both for
data manipulation and for process synchronization. This has the advantage of render-
ing explicit all the interactions of a program with its environment. The original Linda
primitives are, however, not completely adequate for distributed programming; data
protection and security, which are key features of mobile applications, are problematic
because the Linda communication model cannot guarantee data privacy. Distribution
and access control are the main concerns of our contribution.
2.1. Klaim processes
Hereafter, we shall exploit the syntactic categories listed below; all of them are
followed by the symbols we will use (sometimes with indices) to refer to their elements.
S (s) is a set of sites (or physical localities), Loc (l) is a set of (logical) localities,
Vloc (u) is a set of locality variables, Val (v) is a set of basic values, Var (x) is a
set of value variables, Exp (e) is the category of value expressions,  (X ) is a set of
process variables and 	 (A) is a set of parameterized process identiers.
A site can be considered as the address (or the name) of a node where processes and
tuple spaces might be located. Localities are the symbolic names of sites and program-
mers are not required to know the precise mapping of localities on sites. Localities
allow programmers to structure programs over distributed environments while ignoring
the precise allocations of processes and data. A distinguished locality self (2 Loc) is
assumed that programs can use to refer to their own execution site. The set of locality
variables, Vloc, is partitioned into two subsets, NVloc and TVloc. Variables in NVloc
are used to create new sites (i.e. as arguments of newloc), and variables in TVloc are
used to bind localities (i.e. as formals of tuples). Expressions are built up from values
and value variables, by using a set of operators (not specied here). Parameters of
process identiers can be processes, localities and values, and they are provided in this
order.
We sometimes use ‘ to denote both localities and locality variables. Moreover, we
write ~ to denote a sequence of objects and f~g to denote the set of objects in ~.
KLAIM terms are obtained from the abstract syntax in Table 1. Process and locality
variables are typed whenever they are bound; for the sake of simplicity, value variables
are kept untyped. The precise syntax of types, that are ranged over by , will be
introduced in the next section.
Fields, ranged over by f, can be actual elds (i.e. expressions, processes, localities
or locality variables) and formal elds. To avoid confusing names with formal elds
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Table 1
Process syntax
P ::= nil (null process) a:P (action prexing) P1 jP2 (parallel composition) X (process variable) Ah ~P; ~‘; ~ei (process invocation)
a ::= out(t)@‘ j in(t)@‘ j read(t)@‘ j eval(P)@‘ j newloc(u : )
t ::= f jf; t
f ::= e jP j ‘ j x jX :  j u : 
these are denoted by \! var", where var is a generic variable. Tuples, ranged over by
t, are sequences of elds; hence, for a tuple t, ftg will denote the set of elds of t.
KLAIM processes may access tuple spaces through explicit naming: operations are
indexed with the locality of the tuple space. The (non-blocking) operation out(t)@‘
adds the tuple resulting from the evaluation of t to the TS located at ‘. Two (possibly
blocking) operations, in(t)@‘ and read(t)@‘, access tuples in the TS located at ‘.
The operation in(t)@‘ evaluates t and looks for a matching tuple t0 in the TS; if t0 is
found, it is removed from the TS. The corresponding values of t0 are then assigned
to the variables of t and the operation terminates. If no matching tuple is found, the
operation is suspended until one is available. The operation read(t)@‘ diers from
in(t)@‘ only in that the tuple t0 selected by pattern matching is not removed from
the TS.
New threads of executions are dynamically activated through the operation
eval(P)@‘ that spawns a process (whose code is given by P) at the node
named ‘.
Processes can create new sites through the prex newloc(u : ), that is not indexed
with a locality because it is always executed at the current site (self). This operation
creates a \fresh" site that can be accessed via the locality variable u, the type  species
the access control policy of this site.
The operators for building processes are commonly used in Process Algebras and
aim at modelling basic behaviours of concurrent systems. The expression nil stands
for the process that cannot perform any action, a:P stands for the process that rst
executes action a and then behaves like P; P1 jP2 stands for the parallel composition
of P1 and P2, and Ah ~P; ~‘; ~ei stands for the invocation of the process identied by A
with actual parameters ~P; ~‘ and ~e.
Variables occurring in process terms can be bound by prexes and process den-
ing equations. More precisely, prexes in(t)@‘: and read(t)@‘: act as binders for
variables in the formal elds of t. Prex newloc(u : ): binds the locality variable u.
Denition A( ~X : ~; ~u : ~; ~x) def= P is considered as a binder for the variables f ~X g[ f ~ug
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[f ~xg. Hereafter, we assume that all bound names in processes are distinct and require
that the arguments of eval operations do not contain free process variables.
We will use the standard notation P[e=x] to indicate the substitution of the value
expression e for the free occurrences of the variable x in P; P[ ~e= ~x] will denote the
simultaneous substitution of any free occurrence of x2f ~xg with the corresponding
e2f ~eg in P. In particular, when substitutions refer to locality variables, like P[‘=u],
they have to be applied also to the type specications therein. Notation P[ ~P= ~X ; ~‘= ~u; ~e= ~x]
has the expected meaning.
Process identiers are used in recursive process denitions. It is assumed that each
process identier A has a single dening equation A( ~X : ~; ~u : ~; ~x) def= P, where pro-
cess and locality parameters are explicitly typed. All free (value, process and locality)
variables of P are contained in f ~X ; ~u; ~xg and, to guarantee uniqueness of solution of
recursive process denitions, all its process variables and identiers are guarded, i.e.
each process variable=identier occurs within the scope of a blocking in=read prex.
A process is a term without free variables; localities occurring in processes are con-
sidered as constants. In Section 2.3, we will see that they are names whose meaning is
dened (i.e. mapped onto sites) by coordinators. Both processes and localities are rst-
class data and can be manipulated and generated like any other data occurring in tuples.
Processes have higher-order capabilities and can be exchanged when communicating.
Dierently from previous presentations [17, 18], the operator for explicit nondeter-
ministic composition of processes is not considered. This will considerably simplify the
operational semantics while leaving expressivity unchanged. Indeed, this allows us to
have a single-level operational semantics instead of the two-level semantics presented
in [17, 18]. There, we rst considered the evolution of single processes and then that
of whole nets. The two levels enabled us to determine which operand of a nondeter-
ministic composition had been involved in the reduction step of a net. The absence of
explicit nondeterministic choice does not inuence expressivity because nondeterminism
is inherent in the denition of KLAIM operations. It arises when more in=read opera-
tions are suspended while waiting for a tuple or when an in=read operation has more
than one matching tuple. In the former case, when a matching tuple becomes available,
only one of the suspended operations is nondeterministically selected to proceed; in the
latter case, one of the matching tuples is arbitrarily chosen. Hence, within the reduced
language, nondeterminism can be modelled via the pattern matching mechanism; but it
could also be retrieved like, e.g., in [31].
There are several process calculi using explicit localities. For instance, localities in
D [25] model distribution and mobility of -calculus processes. In the distributed
Join calculus [21], another variant of -calculus, channels have a unique locality and
agents may move from a locality to any other locality. In [4] it has been shown that a
fragment of the asynchronous -calculus with localities captures the main features of
the distributed Join calculus. In [6] localities are used to model failures in fragments
of -calculus. Finally, to model distribution of computations and resources over sites
of networks, the Ambient calculus [13] and the Seal calculus [37] rely on the notion
of execution environment (ambient) rather than on that of locality.
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Table 2
Type syntax
 ::= ? (empty type)
j > (universal type)
j ‘ 7!  7!  (arrow type)
j 1; 2 (union type)
j  (type variable)
j : (recursive type)
2.2. Klaim types
We will use fr; i; o; e; nU jU f NVloc; U 6= ;g to indicate the set of process capabil-
ities, where each symbol stands for the operation whose name begins with it; r denotes
the capability of executing a read operation, i the capability of executing an in opera-
tion, and so on. Capability n, that corresponds to the newloc operations, is indexed by
U , a nite, non-empty set of locality variables which will be used to record the set of
(references to) sites dinamically created at a given locality. Polarities are non-empty
subsets of fr; i; o; e; ng, where n is indexed by U . Union between polarities is stan-
dard set union but fnUg [ fnU 0g= fnU[U 0g. We use , ranged over by , to denote
the set of all polarities. We will write n in place of nU whenever U can be safely
ignored.
KLAIM types are dened by the abstract syntax in Table 2; there  ranges over
type variables and  denotes the recursive operator. Hereafter, the following notational
convention will be used: \ 7!" binds stronger than \", that binds stronger than \,".
From a semantical point of view, a type is a nite map that assigns functions from
polarities to types to both localities and locality variables.
The type ? denotes \void", i.e. no intention is declared by the process, and, seman-
tically, corresponds to the smallest type. Conversely, the type > denotes the intention
of performing any kind of operations and is the greatest type. A type of the form
‘ 7!  7!  describes the intention of performing the actions corresponding to the po-
larity  at ‘, moreover it imposes constraint  on the processes that could possibly
be executed at ‘. Hence, the arrow type operator has the usual meaning of logical
implication. The type 1; 2 is the union of types 1 and 2; semantically, it is their
least upper bound. Recursive types are used for typing migrating recursive processes.
A type  generated from the grammar in Table 2 is such that any recursive type
:0 occurring in  does not contain  on the left of 7!. This is a simplication of
the notion of positive type of [5]. The fact that we only deal with a restricted form of
types will be essential in the denition of subtyping.
A consequence of our requirement that each process variable=identier in process
denitions be guarded (i.e. occurs within the scope of a blocking in=read prex) is the
fact that we only use recursive types : whose body  can be written as 1; : : : ; n
and at least one of the i has the form ‘ 7!  7! 0 (for some ‘,  and 0 such that
R. De Nicola et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 240 (2000) 215{254 223
fr; ig \  6= ;). In the following, we will only consider types that satisfy the condition
above and are such that in types of the form ‘ 7!  7!  if e 62  then =?; they will
be called legal types. Note that the syntax in Table 2 is less restrictive; it also permits
types of the form :.
The following notion will be useful in later proofs.
Denition 2.1. The set Sub() of subterms of a type  is the set of types inductively
dened as follows:
 Sub(?)= f?g;
 Sub(>)= f>g;
 Sub()= fg;
 Sub(‘ 7!  7! )= f‘ 7!  7! g[ Sub();
 Sub(1; : : : ; n)= f1; : : : ; ng[ Sub(1)[    [ Sub(n);
 Sub(:)= f:g[ f0[:=] j 0 2 Sub()g.
Finiteness of the sets of subterms for recursive types has been proven in [12]; it
also holds for Sub().
In the rest of this paper we will extensively use systems of (possibly mutually
recursive) type equations for dening n-tuples of types. The solution of a set of n type
equations
f1 = 1; : : : ; n= ng;
where 1; : : : ; n are all the free type variables occurring in 1; : : : ; n, is the n-tuple of
types 1 ; : : : ; n obtained by standard iterative techniques (see, e.g. [36]).
Before ending the section, we would like to remark that recursive processes do not
necessarily have recursive types. Recursive types arise when typing recursive processes
that can migrate. For instance, let us consider the Client=Server system presented in
the Introduction. A dierent client process can be programmed as follows:
Client1
def= read(! u)@lS :eval(P)@u:Client1:
Suppose, for simplicity, that P has no recursion and does not call (even indirectly)
process Client1. The type inferred for Client1 will be c, the same type as the one
derived for process Client in the introduction. Instead, consider process
Client2
def= read(! u)@lS :eval(P jClient2)@u:nil
and again suppose that P has no recursion and does not call (even indirectly) process
Client2. The type of process Client2 now will be the solution of the following recursive
type equation in the type variable :
= lS 7! frg 7!?; u 7! feg 7! (P; ):
Intuitively, the resulting type states that Client2 intends to perform read operations at
lS and to migrate to (the locality denoted by) u together with a process with type P .
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2.3. Klaim nets
A node is a 4-tuple (s; Ps; s; s) where s is a site, Ps is the process located at s,
s is the type of s specifying the access control policy of s, and s is the allocation
environment of s, i.e. a (partial) function from localities to sites. We write s ::ss Ps to
denote the node (s; Ps; s; s).
Hereafter, E denotes the set of environments,  the empty environment, and fs=lg
the environment that maps the locality l on the site s. We use ‘fg to denote (‘),
if (‘) is dened, and ‘, otherwise; moreover, [s=‘] denotes the environment 0 such
that 0(‘)= s and 0(‘0)= (‘0) for ‘0 6= ‘.
To specify the mutual access policies of a set of nodes, hence to consistently assign
types to sites=nodes, we make use of a partial function  that, for each site s, describes
the access rights of s on the other sites. Function  is used to derive a system of type
equations whose solution will give the types of the nodes. Types of nodes have the
same syntax as types of processes. However, strictly speaking, the formers cannot be
generated by the grammar given in Table 2, since we required ‘ to stand for localities
and locality variables. For types of nodes, we let ‘ range over sites.
Denition 2.2. A KLAIM net is a pair NS : where NS is a nite multiset of nodes
over the set of sites S, and  : S * (S *) is a partial function. Function  induces
a system of n type equations in the variables fsi j si 2 Sg where, if fsi1; : : : ; sikg=
dom((si)), the equation of site si is
si = s
i
1 7!(si)(si1) 7! si1 ; : : : ; s
i
k 7!(si)(sik) 7! sik ;
and the following conditions hold:
1. for any node s ::ss P, s(self )= s, and s is the component of the solution of the
system of type equations induced by  corresponding to s;
2. for any pair of nodes s ::ss P and s
0 ::s0s0 P
0, s= s0 implies s= s0 and s= s0 .
Condition 1. expresses that the local allocation environment of a node maps localities
on the sites of the net; in particular, self is mapped on the name (site) of the node.
Moreover, the type of the node is determined by the function  associated to the net.
The idea underlying condition 2. is that the nodes of a net over the same site do have
the same allocation environment and type as well.
In the following, we will write N instead of N : whenever unambiguous. Given a
net N , we assume existence of a function st that returns all sites of N and write NS for a
net N such that st(N )= S. Nets will also be written according to the syntax in Table 3.
This notation will be used in Section 5 in giving the operational semantics of nets.
3. Type equality and subtyping
This section introduces the equality relation on types and the subtyping relation.
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Table 3
Net syntax
N ::= s :: P (node)
j N1 k N2 (net composition)
Table 4
Type equalities
Equalities on union types
(1) 1; 2 = 2; 1
(2) (1; 2); 3 = 1; (2; 3)
(3) ; = 
(4) ?; = 
(5) >; =>
(6) ‘ 7! 1 7! 1; ‘ 7! 2 7! 2 = ‘ 7! 1 [ 2 7! (1; 2)
Equalities on recursive types
(7) 1 :1; 2 :2 = :(1[=1]; 2[=2]) (-renaming)
(8) [:=] = : (folding=unfolding)
(9) [1=] = 1 and [2=] = 2 imply 1 = 2
if  is contractive in  (contraction)
3.1. Type equality
The equality relation will be particularly useful for reducing any (legal) type to a
canonical form.
Denition 3.1. The type equality relation, = is the least congruence that satises the
rules in Table 4.
Laws (1){(3) state that union types are considered as equal modulo commutativ-
ity, associativity and idempotence of their components. Law (4) states that the empty
type adds no information, while (5) states that the universal type makes the strongest
requirements. Law (6) states that the union of two arrow types tagged with the same
locality is the least upper bound with respect to the partial ordering on arrow types
that will be formalized in the next section.
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The remaining rules amount to stating that recursive types are equal if they denote
recursive equations with equal canonical solutions. Law (7) is a generalization to union
types of standard -renaming on recursive types; indeed, := 0 :[0=] follows
from (3) and (7). Moreover, by (7), the type :1;  :2 is considered as equal to
:(1; 2) in accordance with the intuition behind union types. Laws (8) and (9)
are part of the standard axiomatization of equality on recursive types. Namely, (8)
equates two recursive types with equal (possibly innite) expansions. Notice that, by
(8), :=  if  does not occur in . However, (8) is still too weak: we also need
(9) for proving 1 :2 := :[=1; =2]. Law (9) requires  to be contractive in
, i.e.  occurs in  only under 7! .
It is well-known that equality of recursive types (rules (8) and (9) in Table 4) is
decidable; a simple algorithm can be found in [12]. Table 4 simply extends equality to
union types. Since unions are nite, it is easy to verify that equality remains decidable
also for our types. Notice that recursive types are regular terms, namely they have
nitely many subterms, since unions are nite and are equated up to commutativity,
associativity and idempotence of their components.
Let us now dene types in canonical form that allow us to minimize the num-
ber of components and type constructors, and to simplify case analysis when proving
properties.
Denition 3.2. A type is in canonical form if it is generated by the following grammar:
 ::=? j> j1; : : : ; n j :(1; : : : ; n) (n>1)
 ::=  j ‘ 7!  7! 
where 1; : : : ; n and  satisfy the following constraints:
 all bound type variables are distinct;
 all union types 1; : : : ; k are such that, for all i; j (16i; j6k and i 6= j); if i and
j are variables then i 6=j; otherwise L(i) \ L(j)= ;; where L(); the set of
shallow localities of ; is dened inductively on the syntax of  as follows:
L(?)=L(>)=L()= ;; L(‘ 7!  7! )= f‘g
L(1; 2)=L(1)[L(2); L(:)=L();
 all -types :0 are such that  occurs in 0 and it is always \guarded", i.e. on the
right of an even number of 7!’s; moreover, if 0=1; : : : ; n then i 6=  for all i
(16i6k).
The conditions on -types are quite standard, but that on union types is new. Roughly
speaking, in a canonical form 1; : : : ; n (n>1) each component i (16i6n) is either
a variable or an arrow type, with the additional constraint that all shallow localities
be dierent. The condition about shallow localities allows us to easily determine the
polarity and the type associated to a given locality within a canonical form. Notice
that in a canonical recursive type :,  is always contractive in .
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In rewriting a type into canonical form, rules (7){(9) are used for pushing
-binders outside as far as possible. Let us see some examples of useful equalities
on types.
 ‘ 7!  7! (‘ 7!  7!  [ :‘ 7!  7! (‘ 7!  7! )=]) = :‘ 7!  7! (‘ 7!  7! ); and
‘ 7! 7! (‘ 7!  7! [:‘ 7!  7! =])= :‘ 7!  7! , by (8), from which, by (9),
:‘ 7!  7! = :‘ 7!  7! (‘ 7!  7! ).
 By (8), :(; )=(; )[:(; )=] and (; )[:=]= [:=];  := :;
then by contraction (9), :(; )= :.
 By (8), ‘1 7! 1 7! :(‘1 7! 1 7! ; ‘2 7! 2 7! ); ‘2 7! 2 7! :(‘1 7! 1 7! ; ‘2 7! 2
7! )= :(‘1 7! 1 7! ; ‘2 7! 2 7! ). Note that both are solutions of the equation
= ‘1 7! 1 7! ; ‘2 7! 2 7! .
 By (7) and (6), :‘ 7! 1 [ 2 7! = 1 :‘ 7! 1 7! 1; 2 :‘ 7! 2 7! 2.
 By (8) and (7), if  does not occur in  then ;  :0= :(; 0).
By relying on decidability of = ; we are able to reduce types to a canonical form.
The actual proof, that also gives an algorithm for transforming types to canonical forms,
can be found in Section 8.
Proposition 3.3. For any legal type  there is a canonical form 0 such that = 0.
For instance, if 1; 2 and 3 are canonical forms, then
:(‘ 7! 1 [ 2 7! (1[=1]; 2[=2]); ‘3 7! 3 7! 3[=3])
is a canonical form of the type 1 :‘ 7! 1 7! 1; 2 :‘ 7! 2 7! 2; 3 :‘3 7! 3 7! 3.
From now onwards we will only consider types in canonical forms (and their un-
foldings). With abuse of notation, we will continue using  also to refer to canonical
forms.
3.2. Subtyping
This section introduces the subtyping relation 4 . If a process P has type  and
4 0 then P could be thought of as a process of type 0 too; any greater type can be
assigned to a typable process simply by weakening information about its actual inten-
tions. This is the natural intuition underlying any type-inference system with explicit
subsumption. Indeed, according to our denition of subtyping (Table 6), if P1 has type
1; P2 has type 2 and 14 2 then P2 intends to perform more operations than P1.
The subtyping relation between 1 and 2 will allow us to say that P1 can be safely
used in place of P2 but not the vice versa.
To dene the subtyping relation, 4 , we start by introducing an ordering between
polarities, namely a hierarchy over access rights. The chosen ordering relies on the
following assumptions:
 a process that can perform an in operation is also able to perform a read;
 the ability of performing newloc operations does not depend on the locality variables
used;
 a process with polarity  posses also polarity 0, for any 0 .
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Table 5
Subpolarity rules
figv frg fnU1gv fnU2g
1 2
2v 1
1v 01 2v 02
(1 [ 2)v (01 [ 02)
Table 6
Subtyping rules
?4  (ax?)
4> (ax>)
= 0
4 0
(eq)
i4 01 or : : : or i4 
0
k for all 16i6n
1; : : : ; n4 01; : : : ; 
0
k
(u/u)
2v 1; 14 2
‘ 7! 1 7! 14 ‘ 7! 2 7! 2 (7! = 7!)
‘ 7!  7! 4 0[:0=]
‘ 7!  7! 4 :0 ( 7! =)
0[:0=]4 ‘ 7!  7! 
:04 ‘ 7!  7!  ( = 7!)
1[=1]4 2[=2]
1 :14 2 :2
where  is a fresh variable (=)
Denition 3.4. The subpolarity relation, v is the least reexive and transitive rela-
tion closed under the rules in Table 5.
It is immediate to see that v is decidable (it has nite domain). Notice that polar-
ities only take into account the capabilities of processes associated to given localities,
while types consider the intentions of processes, namely they also give an account of
the capabilities after migration. The subtype relation below introduces a hierarchy over
intentions.
Denition 3.5. The subtyping relation over canonical forms and unfoldings of canon-
ical forms, 4 , is the least relation closed under the rules in Table 6.
We now comment on the axioms and rules in Table 6. The empty type ? is smaller
than any other type, while the universal type > is greater than any other type.
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Axiom (eq) only means that if two types 1 and 2 are equated by = ; then obviously
14 24 1. In particular, since we only consider canonical forms and unfoldings of
canonical forms, this rule amounts to saying that canonical forms are considered as
equal up to folding=unfolding.
The type 1; : : : ; n represents the union, i.e. the least upper bound of types 1; : : : ; n,
where the union type constructor is monotonic and any component of the union type is
smaller than the union type itself. As a consequence, 1; : : : ; n4 01; : : : ; 
0
k if for each
i there exists 0j such that i4 
0
j.
If we compare two arrow types, we have ‘1 7! 1 7! 14 ‘2 7! 2 7! 2 if, and only
if, ‘1 = ‘2; 2v 1 and 14 2. This is the standard rule for subtyping over arrow
types, i.e. the 7! constructor is contravariant in its domain (i.e. polarities) and covariant
in its codomain (i.e. types). Two arrow types are incomparable if ‘1 6= ‘2.
The rst two rules for recursive types permit unfolding. Since unfoldings of canonical
forms are not, in general, in canonical form we have to consider these kind of types
explicitly. The last rule is a simplied version of the classical rule
 ; 14 2 ‘ 14 2
  ‘ 1 :14 2 :2
where   is a binding context for type variables and subtyping assumptions, and 1 (2)
occurs only in 1 (2). The rule above takes into account that recursion variables do not
necessarily occur in positive positions. However, since we only consider positive types,
hence monotonic in the recursion variable, a simpler rule can be used, i.e. if 14 2
then :14 :2. This allows us to avoid contexts with subtyping assumptions in
the derivations. Rule (=) in Table 6 uses this property together with the fact that
types are equal up to renaming of bound variables.
One can prove that transitivity is an admissible rule for the subtyping relation (the
actual proof is postponed to Section 8). As a consequence, since types are positive and
type constructors are monotonic, we have that types are monotonic by type substitution.
Proposition 3.6. Let 0; 00 and 000 be canonical forms. If 04 00 and 004 000 are
provable; then 04 000 is provable.
Corollary 3.7. Let 1; 2; 0 and 00 be canonical forms. If 14 2 and 04 00 then
1[0=]4 2[00=].
Decidability of subtyping can now be established. The rules in Table 6 are syntax-
driven. Any proof of 14 2 can be constructed by a simple two-step algorithm: rst
try to prove 1= 2 and if you fail then apply the rules backwards in a syntax-directed
fashion. Since = is decidable, the algorithm for establishing 14 2 is completely
determined once we establish that the axioms (ax?), (ax>) and (eq) have priority
over the other rules. The proof of decidability, that explicitly denes the algorithm,
can be found in Section 8.
Theorem 3.8. The subtyping relation 4 is decidable.
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A more general discussion about equality and subtyping of recursive types can be
found in [5]. Moreover, an ecient algorithm for deciding subtyping in the presence
of recursive types has been proposed in [27]. In our context, decidability of subtyping
involves both union types and recursive types. However, in any type, and then in its
canonical forms, recursive types can only occur in positive positions and satisfy the
constraints in Denition 3.2, thus restricting the problem of subtyping decidability.
4. A capability-based type system
This section introduces the type inference system and the notion of well-typed net.
The inference system is used in the rst phase of the typing analysis for assigning
types to processes.
4.1. The type inference system
Type contexts,   are functions mapping process variables and identiers into types.
They are written as sequences of type assignments, i.e. X1 : 1; : : : ; Xn : n. The symbol
 denotes the empty context.
Given a type context  , we write  [=X ] to denote either the extension of   with
the assignment X :  (when X is unbound in  ), or the updating of   that binds X
to . The auxiliary function update, dened structurally over tuples syntax, behaves
like the identity function for all elds but !X : . Formally, it is dened by
update( ; t)=
8<
:
update(update( ; f ); t0) if t=f; t0
 [=X ] if t= !X : 
  otherwise
The type judgments for processes take the form   ‘P :  where   is a type con-
text providing the type of process variables and identiers in P. A statement such
as   ‘P :  asserts that, within the context  , the intentions of P are those specied
by .
In the conclusion of the inference rules, we will write 1; 2 to denote the canonical
form of the type 1; 2 obtained by applying the rules in Table 4. For instance, we
write that from   ‘P : ‘ 7!  7!  we derive   ‘ out(t)@‘ :P : ‘ 7!  7! ; ‘ 7! fog 7!?
but actually we mean   ‘ out(t)@‘ :P : ‘ 7! [fog 7! .
Notation 4.1. Let  be a canonical form. The following notations are inductively
dened:
  #p ‘:
| ?#p ‘=>#p ‘=  #p ‘= ;;
| (‘0 7!  7! 0) #p ‘=
 ; if ‘ 6= ‘0
 otherwise;
| (1; : : : ; n) #p ‘= 1 #p ‘[    [ n #p ‘;
| (:0) #p ‘= 0 #p ‘.
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  #t ‘:
| ?#t ‘=>#t ‘=  #t ‘=?;
| (‘0 7!  7! 0) #t ‘=
? if ‘ 6= ‘0
0 otherwise;
| (1; : : : ; n) #t ‘= 1 #t ‘; : : : ; n #t ‘;
| (:0) #t ‘= 0[:0=] #t ‘.
 +t ‘:
| ?+t ‘=>+t ‘= +t ‘=?;
| (‘0 7!  7! 0)+t ‘=

0 +t ‘ if ‘ 6= ‘0
0 otherwise;
| (1; : : : ; n)+t ‘= 1 +t ‘; : : : ; n +t ‘;
| (:0)+t ‘=(0[0=]+t ‘)[:0=0], where 0 is fresh.
 f0==‘g:
| ?f0==‘g=?; >f0==‘g=>; f0==‘g=?;
| (‘0 7!  7! 00)f0==‘g=

‘0 7!  7! 00f0==‘g if ‘ 6= ‘0
‘ 7!  7! 0 otherwise;
| (1; : : : ; n)f0==‘g= 1f0==‘g; : : : ; nf0==‘g;
| (:00)f0==‘g= 0 :(00[0=]f0==‘g); where 0 is fresh.
 fg:
| ?fg=?; >fg=>; fg=?;
| (‘ 7!  7! 0)fg= ‘fg 7!  7! 0;
| (1; : : : ; n)fg= 1fg; : : : ; nfg;
| (:0)fg= :(0fg).
Let us comment on the notations introduced above.  #p ‘ and  #t ‘ are used to
denote the polarity and the type associated to ‘ in , respectively. Type  #t ‘ does
not take into account the types relative to those occurrences of ‘ within  that are
on the right of 7! constructors. We use +t ‘ to denote the union of all the types
associated to the outermost occurrences of ‘ within . Notice that when +t is applied
to a recursive type, we pick up the union of the types associated to the outermost
occurrences of ‘ in the body of the recursive type. The unfolding takes place only
after this type has been obtained; this ensures that +t ‘ is well-dened. f0==‘g is
used to denote the type obtained from  by replacing with 0 the types related to the
outermost occurrences of ‘. Type fg is obtained from  by using  to interpret
shallow localities of .
The rules of the type inference system are given in Table 7. We will say that a
process term P is typable if there exist   and  such that   ‘P :  is provable by
using the rules in Table 7.
The type of a process variable (or identier) is completely determined by the type
context,  . Denedness of  (X ) is guaranteed by the fact that processes are closed
terms. The simplest process (the null process nil) has no intentions at all.
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Table 7
KLAIM type inference rules (we assume that A( ~X : eX ; ~u : eu; ~x) def= P)
  ‘X :  (X )   ‘A :  (A) (1)
  ‘ nil : ? (2)
  ‘P : 
  ‘ out(t)@‘ :P : (; ‘ 7! fog 7! ?) (3)
update( ; t)‘P :  +t u4 u for all (! u : u)2ftg
  ‘ read(t)@‘ :P : (; ‘ 7! frg 7! ?) (4)
update( ; t)‘P :  +t u4 u for all (! u : u)2ftg
  ‘ in(t)@‘ :P : (; ‘ 7! fig 7! ?) (5)
  ‘P :    ‘Q : 0
  ‘ eval(Q)@‘ :P : (; ‘ 7! feg 7! 0) (6)
  ‘P :  +t u4 0
  ‘ newloc(u : 0) :P : (f0==ug; self 7! fnfugg 7! ?) (7)
  ‘P : 1   ‘Q : 2
  ‘P j Q : (1; 2) (8)
 [fX = ~X ][=A]‘P : 0 = 0 +t ui4 ui for all ui 2f ~ug
  ‘A :  (9)
  ‘A :    ‘Pi : i and i4 Xi for all Pi 2f ~Pg
  ‘Ah ~P; ~‘; ~ei : [ ~‘= ~u] (10)
The typing rule for out states that the type of out(t)@‘ :P extends the capabilities
of P at ‘ with o. Since out is not a binder, P is typed within the same context as
out(t)@‘ :P.
The typing rules for read and in extend the type of P at ‘ with the corresponding
capability (r or i). The type of P is derived in a context updated with the type assign-
ments for the process variables bound by read and in. The rules apply only whenever
process P properly use the locality variables bound by read and in. This amounts
to saying that, for each locality variable u with type u, the remote operations of P
at u (+t u) do respect u. The typing rule for eval extends the type of P at ‘ with
e and records that the operations of P at ‘ have to be extended with those (0) of the
spawned process Q.
The typing rule for newloc extends the type of P at self with nfug and at u with
type 0; moreover, it checks whether the operations that P is willing to perform at u
(+t u) comply with 0. Notice that the inferred type contains information for mapping
locality variable u to the site where the newloc operation is performed when checking
well-typedness of a net (see Denition 4.9).
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The typing rule for parallel composition states that the intentions of the composed
process are the union of those of the components, while the binding context is left
unchanged. We would like to remark that also in [20] union types have been used for
typing parallel processes.
The typing rule for (possibly recursive) process denition (rule (9)), updates the
type context with the types declared for the process variables occurring as parameters
in the denition and with the binding between the process identier A and a (possibly
recursive) candidate type . The resulting context is exploited to infer (up to type
equality) the type  for P. Similarly to the typing rules for read and in, for each
formal locality variable ui, one checks whether the operations of P at ui (i.e. +t ui)
match the type declaration ui . Finally, the inferred type is .
The last typing rule is the rule for process invocation. First, it determines the type of
the process identier and those of the process arguments. Then, it checks whether the
type inferred for any process argument agrees with that of the corresponding formal
parameter. No requirement is imposed on the other arguments. Types of locality vari-
ables are controlled when one of the rules for in, read and newloc is applied. Types
of localities are controlled when well-typedness of nets is checked. The inferred type
states that Ah ~P; ~‘; ~ei intends to perform at ~‘ the same operations of Ah ~X ; ~u; ~xi at ~u.
Soundness of the application of [ ~l= ~u] to  follows from the assumption that all bound
names in the denition of A are distinct.
Remark 4.2. Subtyping is crucial in typing KLAIM processes. Most of the rules in
Table 7, after recording in the type all the operations the process intends to perform,
check this type with subtyping constraints. A type  matches these constraints if, and
only if, either  or a greater 0 do so. From a semantical point of view, premises of
the form 4 0 play the same role of the subsumption rule
  ‘P :  4 0
  ‘P : 0 :
This rule has not been explicitly introduced because with it we would have lost the
guarantee that our type system derives a unique type for any typable non recursive
process.
We now prove the following substitution property (for possibly open process terms).
Lemma 4.3. Let  [X =X ]‘P : . If   ‘Q : Q and Q4 X ; then   ‘P[Q=X ] : 0 for
some 04 .
Proof. By induction on the length of the derivation of  [X =X ]‘P : . By case analysis
on the last inference rule applied, it can be easily veried that X may occur in  only
in positive positions, and then, by Corollary 3.7, it can be concluded that Q4 X
implies 04 .
Corollary 4.4. Let P1 =P2[ ~P= ~X ; ~l= ~u; ~v= ~x] and suppose that  [fX = ~X ]‘P2 : . If   ‘Pi :
Pi and Pi 4 Xi for any Pi 2f ~Pg; then   ‘P1 : 0 for some 04 [ ~l= ~u].
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We now establish decidability of the type inference system. It is easy to verify that
for any process P such that   ‘P :  may be derived, the following properties hold :
1. if P= nil then = ?;
2. if P=X then = (X );
3. if P= a:Q then  is completely determined by the type derived for Q in the context
obtained by updating   with the types of all the process variables bound by a and,
in case a= eval(R)@‘, by the type derived for R in  ;
4. if P=Ah ~P; ~l; ~vi, where A( ~X : ~; ~u : ~; ~x) def= P, then  is completely determined by the
types of A, ~P and ~X , according to rule (10);
5. if P=Q1 j Q2 then  is the union of the types of Q1 and Q2.
These properties tell us that the type inference system without rule (9) is monomor-
phic, i.e. only one type can be deduced in a context   for a typable process. The
deduced type can be constructed from the syntax of the process by using the types
of its subterms. In the case of rule (9) the type inference system behaves dierently.
When A( ~X : ~; ~u : ~; ~x) def= P, if A is typable, several types can be assigned to it using
rule (9). However, a minimal type exists such that all the deducible types are greater
than it. The proof of this property, that also contains an algorithm to compute the
minimal type, can be found in Section 8.
Theorem 4.5. If   ‘P : 0 then there exists a minimal type  such that   ‘P :  and
4 00 for all 00 such that   ‘P : 00.
Corollary 4.6. For any typable process P; a minimal type  exists such that
(i) ‘P : ;
(ii) 4 0 for any 0 such that ‘P : 0;
(iii) ‘P :  is decidable.
Proof. (i) and (ii) follow from Theorem 4.5 and from closedness of P, (iii) follows
from (i) and from decidability of 4 .
The main impact of the existence of a minimal type is that the type inference system
is decidable.
Corollary 4.7. For any process P; the existence of a type  such that ‘P :  is
decidable.
4.2. Well-typed nets
This section introduces the notion of well-typed net. For a net to be well-typed, it
will be required that the types of the processes in the net agree with the access rights
of the sites where they are located. More specically, the types of the processes, as
determined by the type inference system, are checked against those xed by the net
coordinator, while taking into account where each process has been located.
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To compare process types as inferred from the inference system with the types of
the nodes of the net where processes are allocated, localities have to be mapped into
sites by using site allocation environments, i.e. localities must be interpreted.
Denition 4.8. The type interpretation function associated to a net NS; NS : S!E
is dened as follows: for all s2 S, NS (s)= s if s ::ss P 2NS , for some s
and P.
The type interpretation function is well-dened because NS enjoys conditions 1. and
2. of Denition 2.2. We will write NS [=s] to denote the extension of NS : S!E
to s =2 S that yields .
Denition 4.9. Given a type interpretation function NS , an s2 S and a type , the
interpretation fNSgs of  in s is (a canonical form of) the type without occurrences
of locality variables dened inductively on the syntax of  as follows:
 ?fNSgs=?, >fNSgs=>, fNSgs= ;
 (1; ‘ 7! fnUg [  7! 2)fNSgs = (1[s=U ]fNSgs);
((‘ 7! fng [  7! 2[s=U ])fNSgs);
 if there is no U such that nU 2 , then
(‘ 7!  7! 0)fNSgs =
8<
:
‘fsg 7!  7! 0fNSg‘fsg if ‘fsg2 S
? if ‘2TVloc
‘ 7!  7! 0 otherwise;
 (1; 2)fNSgs = 1fNSgs; 2fNSgs;
 (:0)fNSgs = :0fNSgs.
where [s=U ] denotes the substitution [s=u1; : : : ; s=un] if U = fu1; : : : ; ung.
When inferring types of processes, the locality variables used to denote newly created
sites are interpreted just as local sites. The index of capability n serves this purpose: it
permits to recover the bindings between locality variables and the site where they are
bound. While interpreting an arrow type, to correctly replace all locality variables in
, when an nU is encountered, a substitution function is dened that is also applied to
the context of the arrow type. When interpreting arrow types whose polarities do not
contain an indexed n, three dierent subcases, depending on the interpretation of the
locality on the left of 7!, have to be taken into account:
 either the locality can be interpreted as a site of the net,
 or the locality is a variable for inputting sites,
 or none of the two previous cases arises (e.g. it is a locality that cannot be mapped
to a site of the net).
Locality variables used in tuples for inputting sites do not give any contribution to
the interpreted type because the intentions of processes relative to them are statically
checked during the type inference phase. For this reason, the resulting type in the
second item above is ?. The last item above takes into account localities that cannot
be mapped to sites of the net; in this case the type is left unchanged.
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Table 8
Tuple evaluation function
T<e= =E<e= T<! x= = ! x
T<P= = Pfg T<!X : = = !X : 
T<‘= = (‘) T<! u : = = ! u : 
T<f; t= =T<f=;T<t=
Denition 4.10. A net NS is well-typed if for any node s ::ss P, P is typable and
‘P : , with  minimal type for P, implies fNSgs4 s.
The well-typedness condition implies that processes cannot use a locality if this is
not known in the allocation environment of the node.
5. Operational semantics
The operational semantics of KLAIM nets of processes is presented in Table 11. To
give a simple presentation of the operational rules, the structural congruence,  dened
as the least congruence relation closed under the rules in Table 10, is introduced.
Hereafter, we use ‘ for denoting localities, locality variables and sites and assume
that allocation environments are extended to sites; over them they act as the identity
function. For further explanations and comments we refer the interested reader to [18].
Like in [19, 33], we model tuples as processes. To this aim, we extend KLAIM syntax
with processes of the form out(et) for denoting evaluated tuples (referred to as et).
The evaluation function for tuples, T< =, makes use of an allocation environment
for resolving locality names and relies on an evaluation mechanism, E < =, for closed
expressions (i.e. expressions without variables). In Table 8, that inductively denes
T< =, there is only one non-trivial case, namely the evaluation of a process T<P=.
This yields a process closure Pfg that stands for the process P packaged with the
allocation environment . Note that types assigned to locality and process variables
in formals are not \evaluated". They both will be evaluated by the pattern matching
predicate when the site to which the locality variable must be bound and the process
to which the process variable must be bound are known.
Process closures are evaluated using the least congruence induced by the laws in
Table 9 that allow us to push closures inside the structure of processes. In Pfg,
a locality ‘ used in P is interpreted as stated in ; however,  can be a \partial"
environment, namely there can be localities that are left unchanged when  is applied
because they are not in its domain. For the evaluation of tfg, there are two missing
cases in the laws in Table 9. The case ‘fg is already covered by the notational
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Table 9
Closure laws
nilfg= nil
X fg= X
(out(t)@‘:P)fg= out(tfg)@‘fg:Pfg
(eval(Q)@‘:P)fg= eval(Q)@‘fg:Pfg
(in(t)@‘:P)fg= in(tfg)@‘fg:Pfg
(read(t)@‘:P)fg= read(tfg)@‘fg:Pfg
(new(u : ):P)fg= new(u : ):Pfg
(P1 j P2)fg= P1fg j P2fg
Ah ~P; ~‘; ~eifg= P[ ~P= ~X ; ~‘= ~u; ~e= ~x]fg if A( ~X : ~; ~u : ~; ~x) def= P
efg= e
! xfg= ! x
(!X : )fg= !X : fg
(! u : )fg= ! u : 
(f; t)fg=ffg; tfg
convention introduced in Section 2.3. The case Pfg is covered by the laws relative
to process closures.
The rst two structural laws in Table 10 say that k is commutative and associative.
The third law permits recollecting (spawning) the null process. The last law relies on
the fact that the environments of sites cannot be dynamically modied; hence, it is
always possible to distribute (recover) the processes located onto the same node over
(from) clones of that node.
We now introduce the notion of conservative extension of the function used to in-
duce the types of the nodes of a net. This notion is used to derive the new types
of the nodes of the net in case of dynamic reconguration. Indeed, when a new
node is created, the types of the nodes of the net have to be \extended" by adding
the rights of the existing nodes over the new one and the rights of the new node over
the existing ones. For obtaining the type of the new node, rst the type assigned to the
locality variable (the argument of newloc) is interpreted by using the local allocation
environment. Then, the interpreted type is used to derive the access rights of the new
node with respect to the other nodes. Finally, the new types of the nodes of the net
are obtained as the solution of a new set of type equations. An extension is called
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Table 10
Congruence laws
N1 kN2 =N2 kN1
(N1 kN2) kN3 =N2 k (N1 kN3)
s :: P = s ::

 (P j nil)
s :: (P1 jP2) = s :: P1 k s :: P2
\conservative" whenever the type specied by the programmer for the new node is
compatible with those induced by the extension.
Denition 5.1. Let S be a nite set of sites and  : S * (S *) be a partial function.
The extension, 0 : (S [ fs0g)* ((S [ fs0g)*) of  with respect to s0 =2 S, , u, a
type interpretation function  with dom()= S [fs0g and s2 S, is dened as follows:
 for all s1; s2 2 S, 0(s1)(s2)=(s1)(s2),
 for all s1 2 S, 0(s1)(s0) = (s1)(s), 0(s0)(s1) = [s0=u]f(s0)g #p s1 and 0(s0)(s0)
= [s0=u]f(s0)g #p s0,
whenever the right-hand sides of the above equalities dier from the empty set. 0 is
a conservative extension, if the following conditions hold:
1. if 0(s)(s) is dened then 0(s)(s)v 0(s0)(s0),
2. for all s1 2 S such that 0(s)(s1) is dened we have 0(s)(s1)v 0(s0)(s1),
3. sj 7!  7! 0 2 Sub([s0=u]f(s0)gs0) and 0 #p s1 6= ;, where s1 2 dom(), imply
0(sj)(s1)v 0 #p s1.
Notation 5.2. In Table 11 the following shorthands are adopted:
| P stands for a type equivalent to 0P[ ~‘= ~ ], where 
0
P is such that update(; t)‘P :
0P and [ ~‘= ~ ] is obtained by restricting [et=T<t=] to locality variables;
| NS0 is the type interpretation function associated to NS0 :, the net before re-
duction;
| si , for si 2 S [fs; s0g, are the components of the solution of the system of type
equations induced by 0, the conservative extension of  with respect to s0, , u,
NS0 [s0 =s
0] and s;
| NS [si =si ]si2S is the net NS where the types si of the nodes are replaced by si .
Rule (1) in Table 11 says that the execution of an out operation adds a tuple to
a tuple space. The local allocation environment is used both for determining the site
where the tuple must be placed and for evaluating the tuple. In particular, if the tuple
contains a eld with a process, the corresponding eld of the evaluated tuple contains
the process resulting from the evaluation of a closure. Hence, processes in a tuple are
transmitted after the interpretation of the used localities by using the local allocation
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Table 11
KLAIM operational semantics (see Notation 5:2)
s0= (‘) et=T<t=
NSks :: out(t)@‘ : Pks0 ::00 P0NSks :: Pks0 ::00 (P0 j out(et))
(1)
s0= (‘)
NSks :: eval(Q)@‘ : Pks0 ::00 P0NSks :: Pks0 ::00 (P0 jQ)
(2)
s0= (‘) match(T<t=; et; s; P;NS0 )
NSks :: in(t)@‘ : P k s0 ::00 out(et)NSks :: P[et=T<t=] k s0 ::00 nil
(3)
s0= (‘) match(T<t=; et; s; P;NS0 )
NSks :: read(t)@‘ : Pks0 ::00 out(et)NSks :: P[et=T<t=]ks0 ::00 out(et)
(4)
s0 62 S [fsg s0 = s[s0=self]
NSks ::ss newloc(u : ) : PNS [si =si ]si2S k s ::
s
s P[s0=u] k s0 ::

s0
s0 nil
(5)
NSks :: P[ ~P= ~X ; ~‘= ~r; ~e= ~x]N
NSks :: Ah ~P; ~‘; ~e iN
A( ~X : ~; ~r : ~; ~x) def= P (6)
N N1 N1N2 N2N 0
NN 0
(7)
environment. This corresponds to having a static scoping discipline for the (remote)
generation of tuples.
A dynamic scoping strategy is adopted for the eval operation, described by rule (2).
In this case the localities of the spawned process are not interpreted by using the local
allocation environment. Instead, the process is transmitted and its execution can be
inuenced by the remote allocation environment.
Rule (3) says that a process can perform an in action by synchronizing with a
process which represents a matching tuple et. Matching (dened in Table 12) takes
as arguments the two candidate tuples, the site where the operation is executed, the
type of the continuation (that is statically derived and retrieved from the symbol table
when it is needed) and the type interpretation function of the net. The result of this
synchronization is that tuple et is consumed, i.e. the corresponding process becomes
nil, and its values are used to replace, within the process which has performed the in
operation, the free occurrences of the corresponding variables of t (this substitution is
denoted by [et=T<t=]).
Rule (4) can be interpreted similarly to (3). Only notice that, while in modies
the tuple space, read does not; in the conclusions of rule (4) the tuple space is left
unchanged by process evolution.
Rules (1){(4) do not introduce new sites. The creation of a new node, made possible
by newloc, is described in rule (5). The new node inherits (part of) the access rights
and all the knowledge of the creating node. The environment of the new node is derived
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Table 12
Matching rules
match(v; v; s; ;NS ) match(P; P; s; ;NS ) match(s; s; s
0; ;NS )
match(v; ! x; s; ;NS )
‘P : 00 00fNSgs4 fNSgs
match(P; !X : ; s; 0; NS )
[s=u]fNSgs4 s
match(s; ! u : ; s0; 0; NS )
match(! x; v; s; ;NS )
‘P : 00 00fNSgs4 fNSgs
match(!X : ; P; s; 0; NS )
[s=u]fNSgs4 s s(u; s0; 0; NS )
match(! u : ; s; s0; 0; NS )
match(f1; f2; s; ;NS ) match(t1; t2; s; ;NS )
match((f1; t1); (f2; t2); s; ;NS )
from that of the creating one (with the obvious update for the self locality). The type
of the new node is obtained from that associated to the locality variable argument of
newloc and from that of the node where the creating process runs, as specied in the
notion of conservative extension. Indeed, the creation of a new node s0 modies the
topology of the net, namely the type s00 of an old node s00 is \enriched" with the type
s0 7! s00 #p s 7! s0 . Thus, any node has a greater type than the one before the inferred
reduction. This modication is necessary to allow operations at s0.
Finally, rule (6) deals with process invocation while rule (7) is the standard rule
that relates operational semantics and structural congruence.
The pattern matching predicate used in Table 11 is dened in Table 12, and relies
on the auxiliary predicate s that we introduce below.
Denition 5.3. Let = [s=u]fNSgs0 ; then predicate s(u; s0; ;NS ) holds if:
|  #p s 6= ; implies s0 #p sv  #p s;
| sj 7!  7! 0 2 Sub() and 0 #p s 6= ; imply sj #p sv 0 #p s,
where Sub() has been introduced in Denition 2.1.
Predicate s is indexed by the site s received in a communication. The parameters
of the predicate are the variable that will be bound to s, the site where the operation
is invoked, the type of the continuation and the type interpretation function of the net.
Predicate s(u; s0; ;NS ) is satised when the operations that the continuation process
P intends to perform at site s, from any site s00 the process can migrate to, do match
the access rights of site s00 over s.
Matching rules ensure that if read=in looks for sites with type  and 00 is the result
of interpreting [s=u], then only sites with type 0 such that 004 0 would be accepted;
while if read=in looks for processes with type  then only processes with type 0 whose
interpretation is less than or equal to that of  would be accepted.
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Table 13
An additional type inference rule for Table 7
‘ out(et) :? (11)
6. Types and reductions
In this section, we state and prove a subject reduction theorem and a type safety
theorem. Subject reduction guarantees that well-typedness is an invariant of the oper-
ational semantics. Type safety guarantees that well-typed nets are free from run-time
errors. Such errors are generated when processes attempt to execute actions that are
not permitted by their capabilities. As a result of these two theorems, we have that
well-typed nets never encounter run-time errors due to misuse of access rights. In other
words, the errors that the KLAIM type system precludes are those due to access right
violations.
Before proving these theorems we need to dene typing of the auxiliary process
out(et). To this purpose the type inference rule in Table 7 is added to those in Table 13.
The rule states that evaluated tuples always have the empty type (since they are rep-
resented by passive processes).
To show that well-typedness is an invariant of the operational semantics, we pro-
ceed in two steps. First, we prove that well-typedness is preserved under structural
congruence; then, we prove that well-typedness is preserved under reduction.
Proposition 6.1. If N is well-typed and N N 0 then N 0 is well-typed.
Proof. By easy inspection of the axioms in Table 10.
Theorem 6.2 (Subject reduction). If NS is well-typed and NSN 0S0 then N
0
S0 is well-
typed.
Proof. By induction on the length of the derivation of NSN 0S0 .
Base step: By case analysis on axioms (1){(5).
Rule (1). Since no new node is created, we must prove that from s0= (‘), et=
T<t= and NS0ks :: out(t)@‘ : Pks0 ::
0
0 P
0=NS well-typed it follows that NS0ks ::
Pks0 ::00 P0 j out(et)=N 0S is well-typed. The well-typedness hypothesis implies that
P0fNSgs0 4 0, where P0 is a minimal type such that ‘P0 : P0 . Now, out(et)
has type ? and by the type inference rule (8) we get ‘P0 j out(et) : P0 . Since
NS =N 0S , P0fN 0S gs0 4 0 directly follows from the well-typedness hypothesis. We
are only left to show that if ‘P : P with P minimal type then PfN 0S gs4 . Sup-
pose that ‘ out(t)@‘ : P : 1. Then, the type inference rule (3) is the last rule used and
1= P; ‘ 7! fog 7!?. Since s0= (‘), the well-typedness hypothesis implies that
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(P; ‘ 7! fog 7!?)fNSgs=(PfNSgs; s0 7! fog 7!?) 4 . Then, the thesis follows
by the subtyping rule (u=u) and the fact that NS =N 0S .
Rule (2). Also in this case no new node is created, then we must prove that from
s0= (‘) and NS0 k s :: eval(Q)@‘ : P k s0 ::
0
0 P
0=NS well-typed it follows that NS0 k s
:: P k s0 ::
0
0 P
0 jQ=N 0S is well-typed. With respect to the previous case we are left
to show that QfN 0S gs0 4 0 where Q is a minimal type such that ‘Q : Q. Sup-
pose that ‘ eval(Q)@‘ : P : 1. Then, the type inference rule (6) is the last rule
used and 1= P; ‘ 7! feg 7! Q, where P is a minimal type such that ‘P : P .
Since s0= (‘), the well-typedness hypothesis implies that (P; ‘ 7! feg 7! Q)fNSgs=
(PfNSgs; s0 7! feg 7! QfNSgs0)4 . Then, by the subtyping rule (u/u), it follows
that s0 7! feg 7! QfNSgs0 4 . In particular, this implies that (s0 7! feg 7! QfNSgs0)
#t s0= QfNSgs0 4 0=  #t s0, where the last equality follows by denition of  #t ‘
and of type of a node. The thesis follows from the fact that NS =N 0S .
Rule (3). Again the set of nodes of the net is unchanged and we must prove that from
s0= (‘), update(; t)‘P : P with P minimal type, match(T<t=; et; s; P;NS ) and
NS0 k s :: in(t)@‘ : P k s0 ::
0
 out(et)=NS well-typed, it follows that NS0 k s ::
P[et=T<t=] j s0 ::00 nil=N 0S is well-typed. Actually, it suces to show that from
1fNSgs 4 , where ‘ in(t)@‘ : P : 1 with 1 minimal type, it follows that 2fN 0S gs
4 , where ‘P[et=T<t=] : 2 with 2 minimal type. Since the type inference rules are
syntax-driven, rule (5) is the last rule used and 1= P; ‘ 7! fig 7!?, where P +t u4 u
for all (! u : u)2ftg. Since match(T<t=; et; s; P;NS ) holds, Corollary 4.4 implies
24 P[ ~‘= ~ ], where [ ~‘= ~ ] is the substitution obtained by restricting [et=T<t=] to lo-
cality variables only. Since NS =N 0S , we are left to prove that P[
~‘= ~ ]fNSgs4 .
The well-typedness hypothesis PfNSgs4  means that the following facts hold:
1. for all ‘2 S, (PfNSgs) #p ‘ 6= ; implies  #p ‘v (PfNSgs) #p ‘;
2. for all ‘0 7! 0‘0 7! 0‘0 2 Sub(PfNSgs), for all ‘2 S, 0‘0 #p ‘ 6= ; implies ‘0 #p
‘v 0‘0 #p ‘ and 0‘0 #t ‘4 ‘0 #t ‘.
Now, it is easy to verify that the following properties hold:
(P[ ~‘= ~ ]) #p ‘=

P #p ‘ if ‘ 62 f ~‘g;
(P #p ‘)[ (P #p u) otherwise;
(P[ ~‘= ~ ]) #t ‘=

(P #t ‘)[ ~‘= ~ ] if ‘ 62 f ~‘g;
(P #t ‘)[ ~‘= ~ ]; (P #t u)[ ~‘= ~ ] otherwise;
(P[ ~‘= ~ ])+t ‘=

(P +t ‘)[ ~‘= ~ ] if ‘ 62 f ~‘g;
(P +t ‘)[ ~‘= ~ ]; (P +t u)[ ~‘= ~ ] otherwise:
By using the above properties, the fact that P +t u4 u for all (! u : u)2ftg and the
premises of predicate match we can conclude that facts 1. and 2. still hold when the
type P[ ~‘= ~ ]fNSgs is considered instead of PfNSgs. Hence, the thesis follows by
the monotonicity of type constructors (Corollary 3.7).
Rule (4). This proof is similar to the one above.
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Rule (5). In this case a new node with site s0 is created and we must prove that from
s0 62 S 00 [fsg, s0 = s[s0=self ] and NS00 k s ::ss newloc(u : ) : P=NS well-typed with
types induced by , it follows that NS00 [si =si ]si2S k s ::
s
s P[s
0=u] k s0 ::

s0
s0 nil=N
0
S0 is
well-typed with types induced by 0 (where 0 is the conservative extension of  w.r.t.
s0, , u, s0 and s, and si for si 2 S 00 [fs; s0g are the components of the solution of the
system of type equations induced by 0). Since the type of any old node is replaced
by a greater one, s0 62 image(sj) for any node sj ::
sj
sj Pj 2NS and s0 has not yet ex-
changed via communications, we are only left to show that from 1fNSgs4 s, where
‘ newloc(u : ) : P : 1 with 1 minimal type, it follows that 2fN 0
S0
gs4 s , where
‘P[s0=u] : 2 with 2 minimal type. Since the type inference rules are syntax-driven,
rule (7) is the last rule used and 1= P; self 7! fng 7!? where ‘P : P with P
minimal type and P +t u= . By Corollary 4.4, 24 P[s0=u]. Now, N 0S0 =NS [s0 =s
0],
hence to prove the thesis it suces to prove that P[s0=u]fNS [s0 =s0]gs4 s . Moreover,
P +t u=  implies (P +t u)[s0=u] = [s0=u] which, since s0 is fresh, implies P[s0=u]+t s0
= [s0=u]. From the well-typedness hypothesis, from the denitions of type interpreta-
tion and of conservative extension, and by using Corollary 3.7, we have
P[s0=u]fNS [s0 =s0]gs = P[s0=u]f[s0=u] ==s0gfNS [s0 =s0]gs
= P[s0=u]f[s0=u]fNS [s0 =s0]gs0 ==s0gfNSgs
4 P[s0=u]fs0 ==s0gfNSgs
4 PfNSgs[s0=s]fs0 ==s0g; PfNSgsfs0 ==s0g
4 s[s0=s]fs0 ==s0g; s
4 s :
Inductive step: By case analysis on the last operational rule used, namely rule (6)
or (7).
Rule (6). By induction since, by Corollary 4.4, ‘Ah ~P; ~‘; ~ei : [ ~‘= ~ ], where ‘A : 
and A( ~X : ~; ~ : ~; ~x) def= P, and ‘P[ ~P= ~X ; ~‘= ~; ~e= ~x ] : 0 with 0 minimal type imply 04
[ ~‘= ~ ].
Rule (7). By standard inductive arguments and by Proposition 6.1.
We now introduce the notion of run-time error and prove type safety. Run-time
errors are dened in Table 14 in terms of the predicate N s! error that holds true
when within the net N a process P at site s attempts to perform an action that is not
allowed by its capabilities. Let us recall that the type of a site codies the policy of
access rights and that  #p s0 denotes the access rights of s over s0, for s and s0 sites
and  type of s.
We rely on the following notation. Given an action a (in(t)@‘1, out(t)@‘2; : : :),
cap(a) denotes the corresponding capability (i; o; : : :) and loc(a) denotes the locality
name in a (‘1; ‘2; : : :). Thus, loc(out(t)@‘)= ‘ and similarly for the other actions apart
244 R. De Nicola et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 240 (2000) 215{254
Table 14
Run-time error
(act)
 #p (loc(a)) 6v fcap(a)g
s :: a :P
s! error
(ide)
s :: P[ ~P= ~X ; ~‘= ~u; ~e= ~x]
s! error
s :: Ah ~P; ~‘; ~ei s! error
A( ~X : ~; ~u : ~; ~x) def= P
(par)
N s! error
N k N 0 s! error
(str)
N  N 0 N 0 s! error
N s! error
for newloc for which we let loc(newloc(u : ))= self. We write 6v ,  64 0 and N
s
6!
error for the negation of v , 4 0 and N s! error, respectively.
Theorem 6.3 (Type safety). If N is well-typed then; for every site s; N
s
6! error.
Proof. By induction on length of the derivation of N s! error, we prove that N s! error
implies that N is not well-typed.
The base step is when rule (act) of Table 14 is the only rule used. In this case
we have that N = s :: a :P and s ::

 a :P
s! error because  #p (loc(a)) 6v fcap(a)g.
The thesis obviously holds when a:P is not typable in the type context . Hence,
assume that a type 0 exists such that ‘ a:P : 0 (without loss of generality, let 0
be a minimal type for a:P). We are left to show that 0fNSgs 64 . By the type
inference rules (3){(7) in Table 7 and by rule ( 7!= 7!) of subtyping, we have that
loc(a) 7! fcap(a)g 7!?4 0. Hence, by Denition 4.9, we have that (loc(a) 7! fcap(a)g
7!?)fg4 0fNSgs. The fact that  #p (loc(a)) 6v fcap(a)g implies that (loc(a))
7! fcap(a)g 7!?=(loc(a) 7! fcap(a)g 7!?)fg 64 . The thesis now follows because
otherwise we would have 0fNSgs4  and, by transitivity, (loc(a) 7! fcap(a)g 7!?)
fg4 .
We now consider the inductive step. We proceed by case analysis on the last rule
applied in the derivation of N s! error.
(ide) Assume that A( ~X : ~; ~u : ~; ~x) def= P; we have s :: Ah ~P; ~‘; ~ei s! error because s ::
P[ ~P= ~X ; ~‘= ~u; ~e= ~x] s! error. Again, the thesis obviously holds when Ah ~P; ~‘; ~ei is
not typable in the type context . Hence, assume that there exists a type 1
such that ‘Ah ~P; ~‘; ~ei : 1. We show that 1fNSgs 64 . By the type inference
rules (9) and (10), ‘Ah ~P; ~‘; ~ei : 1 implies that there exists a type 2 such
that [fX = ~X ][2=A]‘P : 2; 1 = 2[ ~‘= ~u] and, for each Pi 2f ~Pg; ‘Pi : i and
i4 Xi . Hence, by Corollary 4.4, we can derive that there exists a type 3 such
that [2=A]‘P[ ~P= ~X ; ~‘= ~u; ~e= ~x] : 3 and 34 2[ ~‘= ~u]. By induction, we may as-
sume that s :: P[ ~P= ~X ; ~‘= ~u; ~e= ~x]
s! error implies that s :: P[ ~P= ~X ; ~‘= ~u; ~e= ~x] is not
R. De Nicola et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 240 (2000) 215{254 245
well-typed, i.e. that 3fNSgs 64 . This together with the fact that 34 2[ ~‘= ~u] =
1 and with Denition 4.9 imply the thesis.
(par) Notice that if N 0 is not well-typed then N kN 0 is not well-typed. Then, it
suces to apply the inductive hypothesis.
(str) Apply the inductive hypothesis and Proposition 6.1.
Since well-typedness is preserved along sequences of reduction steps, we can con-
clude that well-typed nets never generate run-time errors during their evolution.
Corollary 6.4. Let  be the reexive and transitive closure of . If N is well-typed
and N N 0 then there is no site s such that N 0 s! error.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of N N 0. The base step is
Theorem 6.3, the inductive step follows from Theorems 6.2 and 6.3.
Remark 6.5. A choice we had to face when designing the type system was that of
xing the type to be associated to newly created sites. Our choice was to allow pro-
grammers to impose type constraints on the newly created site by explicitly restricting
the type of the node where the creating process is running.
Here we briey discuss the impact of a dierent choice that does not allow pro-
grammers to impose type restrictions when creating new sites.
The type inference rule for newloc(u) becomes
  ‘P : 
  ‘ newloc(u) :P : (; self 7! fng 7!?) (7
0)
and no check is performed on the kind of the operations that P intends to perform at
u; the rule only extends the type of P at self with n. The notion of extension needs
now to be modied to allow dynamically created nodes to inherit the access rights of
the creating one. An extension 0 of a  now only depends on s0 =2 S and s2 S; and
the last item of Denition 5.1 becomes
 for all s1 2 S; 0(s1)(s0)=(s1)(s); 0(s0)(s1)=(s)(s1) and 0(s0)(s0)=(s)(s).
Moreover, any extension is conservative. The operational rule for newloc does not
formally change, but the new denition of extension leads to greater types of the
dynamically created nodes.
7. Programming examples and paradigms
In this section we provide a complete programming example in KLAIM. Then, we
illustrate some basic programming paradigms for mobile code applications.
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7.1. Distributed information retrieval
Distributed information retrieval applications gather information from a set of sources
distributed over a network; the nodes to be visited may be determined either statically
or dynamically. This kind of application is a paradigmatic example for mobile compu-
tation. Here, we present a KLAIM solution of a distributed information retrieval problem
and discuss some of the access control issues there involved.
Let us assume that strings, denoted by sequences of characters between quotation
marks, are basic values. Consider a user process that needs information about a data
of which he only has a key represented, say, by \item", to be used for searching in a
database distributed over the network.
In our solution, the distributed database is modelled by located tuple spaces and it
is assumed that each local database (a tuple space) reachable from ‘item (the starting
point of the search which is known by the user process) contains either a tuple of the
form (\item"; v) with the required information v; or a tuple of the form (\item"; snext);
with the site of the next node to search.
The user process UP asks for the execution at ‘item of the mobile gatherer agent,
G; which travels across the nodes looking for tuples containing information associated
to \item". This agent takes as parameters the key \item" and a freshly created locality
ur that represents the private address where UP would like to receive the result of the
search.
The user process UP can be programmed in KLAIM as follows:
UP= newloc(ur :?) :eval(Gh\item"; uri)@‘item : in(! x)@ur :P
The agent G is programmed as follows:
G(x; u :?)= read(x; ! u0 : 0)@self :eval(Ghx; ui)@u0 :nil
j read(x; !y)@self :out(y)@u:nil
The site dynamically created by UP is accessible only via ur; hence, if it is assumed
that P never communicates the value of ur; then only processes UP and G can access
this site. To guarantee that for continuing the search the gatherer agent receives only
sites with appropriate rights, it suces to choose 0 such that G[ur=u]4 0.
If process P has type P; then the inferred types of UP and G are
UP = self 7! fng 7!?; ur 7! fig 7!?; ‘item 7! feg 7! G[ur=u]; P
G = :(self 7! frg 7!?; u 7! fog 7!?; u0 7! feg 7! ):
Let us now see how types can be used to enforce access control policies by con-
sidering a net with three sites s; s1 and s2; with types s; s1 and s2 . Assume that s1
contains the tuple (\item"; s2); s2 contains the tuple (\item"; v); and the user process
UP is at site s and s(‘item)= s1. Then, the relevant part of the net is
s ::ss UP k s1 ::
s1
s1 out(\item"; s2) k s2 ::
s2
s2 out(\item"; v):
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Checking whether the net is well-typed requires determining the interpretation of
UP with respect to the allocation environments and comparing the resulting type with
s. The interpretation of UP is
s 7! fi; ng 7!?; s1 7! feg 7! (s1 7! frg 7!?; s 7! fog 7!?); [P]
where [P] denotes the interpretation of P . For guaranteeing well-typedness, we should
make sure that
(s 7! fi; ng 7!?; s1 7! feg 7! (s1 7! frg 7!?; s 7! fog 7!?); [P])4 s
which depends on (s1 7! frg 7!?; s 7! fog 7!?)4 s1 and [P]4 s:
The type 0 of the variable u0 used by the agent G when reading continuation sites
is used statically (by the type inference system) to check whether G[ur=u]4 0; and
dynamically (by the matching predicate) to select the appropriate tuple. For instance,
the gatherer agent G can travel from s1 to s2 only if the tuple (\item"; s2) can be
selected; this amounts to requiring that the interpretation of 0[s2=u0] is less than or
equal to s2 .
7.2. Code mobility
Mobile code applications are applications running over a network whose distinctive
feature is the exploitation of forms of \mobility". Below we rst show how to model
code-on-demand, then describe how one can use it together with (non-obvious) type
structures to implement \safe" remote evaluation.
Code-on-demand: A component of an application running over a network on a given
node, can dynamically download some code from a remote node and link it to perform
a given task.
To download code that respects certain type constraints  and is stored in a tuple
at a remote tuple space l; action read(!X : )@l:X can be used. The downloaded code
is checked for access violations at run time by the pattern-matching mechanism. The
typing rules for read and in are designed in such a way that any downloaded code
whose type is a subtype of  will not violate type correctness.
Remote evaluation: Any component of a networking application can invoke services
from other components by transmitting both the data needed to perform the service
and the code that describes how to perform the service.
To transmit both code P and data v at the locality l of the server, action out(in(!y)
@l :Ahyi; v)@l; where A(x) def= P; can be used. Here, we assume that the server adopts
the following (code-on-demand) protocol
in(!X : ; !x)@self :out(x)@self :X:
To prevent \damages" from P; the server may mount and execute code P only if [P];
the type of the code P when interpreted at the server’s site, is such that [P]4 [];
where [] is the interpretation of  at the server’s site.
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Type  may give only minimal access permissions on the server’s site, for instance,
only the capability of reading some resources and giving back the results of the exe-
cution. In this case, [] is of the form
s 7! frg 7!?; s0 7! fog 7!?; s1 7! fog 7!?; : : : sn 7! fog 7!?;
where si; i=0; : : : ; n, are the sites with the rights of invoking server’s facilities, and s
is the server’s site.
Notice, however, that this does not prevent P from visiting other sites. In particular,
agent P may be programmed in such a way that after having performed the required
elaboration, it transmits code Q at the locality li (the logical name of site si):
P def= read(!x)@l :out(op(x; y))@self:out(Q)@li :nil:
It is immediate to see that, if we assume that the client is allocated at site s0 and that
P has type P = l 7! frg 7!?; self 7! fog 7!?; li 7! fog 7!?; then [P] = s 7! frg 7!?;
s0 7! fog 7!?; si 7! fog 7!?: Hence, [P]4 []. However, code Q is only stored in
the tuple space at si: no new thread of execution is activated at site si. Before being
executed code Q must be read and veried (dynamic type checking). Therefore, process
P cannot activate a Trojan horse at the remote site si.
8. Detailed proofs
In this section we present the proofs of some syntactical properties of the KLAIM
type system, that have been skipped or just sketched in the earlier sections.
Proposition 8.1 (Proposition 3.3). For any type  there is a canonical type 0 such
that = 0.
Proof. A simple (innermost) procedure to reduce  to 0 can be dened as follows.
First, by (8), erase all -binders that bind no variables and, by (9), reduce sequences
of -binders, that is rewrite 1: : : : n : as :[=1; : : : ; =n] and erase any i= 
in :1; : : : ; n. Then, reduce union types via a two-step procedure. By (1){(5), erase
components that are ? or repetition (possibly use (7)), and absorb in > other com-
ponents. By (7) and, possibly, (8) and (9) fold all  operators as much as possible,
so that no components of the union type is a -type and sequences of -types are re-
duced to only one -type. Finally, once a type of the form :1; : : : ; n or 1; : : : ; n
is obtained, such that all i are canonical, then use (6) to rewrite 1; : : : ; n so that
L(i) \ L(j)= ;.
Proposition 8.2 (Proposition 3.6). Let 0; 00 and 000 be canonical forms. If 04 00
and 004 000 are provable; then 04 000 is provable.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of 04 00. The base step is trivial since, when-
ever 04 00 is an axiom, then either 0=?; or 00=> (then 000=>), or 0= 00
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and canonical forms are considered as equivalent up to folding=unfolding. The induc-
tive step is proved by case analysis on the last rule used for deriving 04 00. For
each case, consider all possible subcases in relation to the last rule used for deriving
004 000. The proof follows from the inductive hypothesis by relying on the following
two properties:
(i) if D is a derivation of ‘ 7!  7! 4  (for some  dierent from > and from
‘ 7!  7!  up to =), then = :1; : : : ; n (or = 1; : : : ; n), 9i : 16i6n such
that i= ‘ 7! i 7! 0i ; and iv  and 4 0i[=] (or 4 0i) are already proved
in D;
(ii) if D is a derivation of 4 ‘ 7!  7!  (for some  dierent from ? and
from ‘ 7!  7!  up to =), then = :‘ 7! 1 7! 1 (or = ‘ 7! 1 7! 1), and
v 1 and 14 [=] (or 14 ) are already proved in D.
Theorem 8.3 (Theorem 3.8). The subtyping relation 4 is decidable.
Proof. Consider the following algorithm for proving 14 2.
1. If 1 (2) is ? or >; then apply axioms (ax?) or (ax>) and stop.
2. If 1= 2 then stop (by axiom (eq)).
3. If 1 or 2 is a union type, then apply (u=u) until the remaining subgoals do not
involve union types.
4. If both 1 and 2 are arrow types, apply ( 7!= 7!).
5. If one of 1 and 2 is an arrow type and the other is a -type, then proceed in the
following way. Without loss of generality, we may assume that 1 is ‘ 7!  7! 0
and 2 is :1; : : : ; n (the converse is similar). Let us consider the unfolded form
of 2. If ‘ =2L(i[2=]) for all i (16i6n) then fail. Otherwise, by canonicity, there
is a single i such that i[2=] is of the form ‘ 7! i 7! i; then check iv  and
04 i ; where 0 is already in canonical form and i is a canonical form of i.
6. If both 1 and 2 are -types, apply (=) and compare their bodies.
Soundness of the decision algorithm follows from the fact that steps 3, 4 and 6 have a
direct correspondent in the subtyping rules, while step 5 corresponds to applying either
(7!=) or (= 7!), plus (7!= 7!). We are left to prove that the algorithm terminates.
This proof proceeds by induction on the cardinality of Sub(1) [ Sub(2); the set of
subterms of the types 1 and 2 (by denition, this cardinality cannot become smaller
than 2). Since v on polarities and = on types are decidable, termination of the
decision algorithm follows from the fact that steps 1 and 2 do not generate subgoals,
while steps 3{6 generate new subgoals with a smaller set of subterms.
For proving existence of the minimal type, we need some technical preliminaries.
Denition 8.4. A type scheme  is a pair h:; f1 = 1; : : : ; n= ngi where n>1 and
; 1; : : : ; n are all the free type variables that can occur in  and in each type i. The
solution of , () is the type :[1 =1; : : : ; n =n], where 1 ; : : : ; n is the solution
of the system of type equations in the type scheme.
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Proposition 8.5. Given = h:; f1 = [ ~‘1= ~u1]; : : : ; n= [ ~‘n= ~un]gi and 0= h:0;
f1 = 0[ ~‘1= ~u1]; : : : ; n= 0[ ~‘n= ~un]gi; if 4 0 then ()4 (0).
Proof. By denition, 4 0 implies [ ~‘i= ~ui]4 0[ ~‘i= ~ui] for all 16i6n. This, by
Corollary 3.7, implies ()4 :[1 =1; : : : ; n =n] where 1 ; : : : ; n is the solutions
of the set of equations f1 = 0[ ~‘1= ~u1]; : : : ; n= 0[ ~‘n= ~un]g. Now, 4 0 implies
:[1 =1; : : : ; n =n]4 :0[1 =1; : : : ; n =n] = (0). Then, ()4 (0) follows by
Proposition 3.6.
Lemma 8.6. Let D be a derivation of  ; ~X : ~; A : 0 ‘P : 0 in the proof system; where
A( ~X : ~; ~u : ~; ~x) def= P and no process identier other than A occurs in P. Then; there
exists a minimal type  such that
(i)  ; ~X : ~; A : ‘P :  is derivable;
(ii) 4 0.
Proof. The assumption that no process identier other than A occurs in P implies
that rule (9) is not used in D but in the last step. Then the minimal type  can be
constructed in the following way. Assume that the process identier A has type , where
 is a fresh type variable. For any occurrence of Ah ~P; ~‘; ~ei in P assume Ah ~P; ~‘; ~ei : [ ~‘= ~u]
without applying the substitution. As a consequence, the type derivation for P relies
on a set of hypotheses (i.e. type constraints involving ) which must be checked later.
By considering the rules of Table 7 except for (9), it is easy to verify that our type
derivations have the form
 ; ~X : ~; A : ‘P : 00
where  or [ ~‘= ~u] can occur in 00. Moreover, rule (9) requires = 00 and then
the type derived for P (the body of A) is the solution () of the type scheme
= h:1; f1 = 1[ ~‘1= ~u1]; : : : ; n= 1[ ~‘n= ~un]gi where 1 is obtained by replacing in
00 any occurrence of [ ~‘i= ~ui] with i (i fresh). This gives a derivation of the minimal
type = () for P, which is sound only if subtyping constraints involving , not yet
evaluated, are satised. These constraints can now be checked since types, not type
schemata, are dealt with. The checking will be successful by construction if all the
intentions of P on ~u (registered in the minimal type) agree with the type declared for
the parameters; otherwise P is untypable and the algorithm fails.
For point (ii), because of the deterministic construction of the type for P except
for the case A( ~X : ~; ~u : ~; ~x) def= P, we have that 0 must codify at least all the inten-
tions of P which are in 1 minimal type). Hence, 0 is such that 0= (0) where
0= h:2; f1 = 2[ ~‘1= ~u1]; : : : ; n= 2[ ~‘n= ~un]gi, and 14 2. Therefore, by Proposi-
tion 8.5, = ()4 (0)= 0.
Since our types are monotonic with respect to type substitution, the previous lemma
can be immediately generalized to the case where process identiers other than A occur
in the body P of the denition of A.
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Corollary 8.7. Let  ; ~X : ~; A : 0; A1 : 1; : : : ; An : n ‘P : 0 where A( ~X : ~; ~u : ~; ~x) def= P
and all process identiers occurring in P are in fA; A1; : : : ; Ang. Let 1; : : : ; n such
that; for any Ai( ~X i : ~; ~ui : ~; ~xi)
def= Pi (16i6n);
 ; ~X i : ~; A1 : 1; : : : ; Ai : 0i : : : ; An : n ‘Pi : 0i
implies i4 0i . Then; there exists a minimal type  for P such that  ; ~X : ~; A : ; A1 :
1; : : : ; An : n ‘P :  and 4 0.
We can now prove existence of the minimal type for a given P typable in  .
Theorem 8.8 (Theorem 4.5). If   ‘P : 0 for some 0; then there exists a minimal
type  such that   ‘P :  and 4 00 for all 00 such that   ‘P : 00.
Proof. The minimal type of P can be dened, in a trivial way, by structural induction
on P, from the minimal types of its subterms. The only interesting case concerns
occurrences of process denitions in P. For any process denition, the algorithm dened
in the proof of Lemma 8.6 is used to obtain the minimal type. The statement can now
be proven by induction on the length of the derivation of   ‘P : 00.
Base step: All cases are trivial but rule (9), for which use Lemma 8.6.
Inductive step: Apply directly the inductive hypothesis. It suces to notice that in
each inference rule the type of the term in the consequent is greater than the type of
the subterms in the antecedent and that type constructors are monotonic. In the case
of rule (9), the proof follows from Corollary 8.7.
9. Concluding remarks
We have developed a type system which formalizes access control restrictions of
programs written in KLAIM. Type information is used to specify access rights and
execution privileges, and to detect violations of these policies. The implementation of
the type inference system for X-KLAIM (the prototype implementation of KLAIM) is in
progress; it will help us also to assess our design choices.
Recently, distributed variants of the -calculus have been introduced (e.g. Ambient
Calculus [13] and D [25]) as foundational calculi for network programming. Syntac-
tically, these calculi are very dierent from KLAIM, however simple variations of KLAIM
types can be applied to them to specify and enforce access control policies.
We plan to extend the type system by introducing types for tuples (record types),
notions of multi-level security (by structuring localities into levels of security) and
public or shared keys to model dynamic transmission of access rights. Ideas could
also be borrowed from the spi-calculus [2], a concurrent calculus obtained by adding
public-key encryption primitives to the -calculus [29], and from the SLam calculus
[24], another calculus where information about direct=indirect producers and consumers
are associated to data.
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Another direction for future research is considering \open" systems. In fact, our type
system can safely deal with new processes landing on existing nodes, but it does not
consider partially specied nets. An enrichment of types is then needed to specify the
permissions granted to \unspecied" sites. Then, the choice has to be faced whether
this enrichment should be specied at the level of single nodes or at the level of nets.
Interfacing nets would naturally t with extensions of our framework to hierarchical
nets that would be benecial also for more structured access controls. An alternative
approach to deal with open systems could also be that of relaxing the static type
checking phase by not requiring well-typedness of the whole net (this corresponds
to the fact that only the typed sites can be trusted) while increasing the run-time
type checking phase, e.g. agents migrating from untyped (i.e. untrusted) sites must be
dynamically typechecked. This is the approach followed in [34].
Type systems have been used also for other calculi of mobile processes. Among
those reminiscent of ours, although not addressing security issues, we mention the
work of Pierce and Sangiorgi [32]. They develop a type system for the -calculus
using channels types to specify whether channels are used to read or to write. This
type system has been extended in [26] by associating multiplicities to types for stating
the number of times each channel can be used. The type system of [32] has been also
generalized by Sewell [35] to capture locality of channel names and by Boreale and
Sangiorgi [10] to trimmer bisimulation proofs.
Only recently attempts have been made to characterize security properties in terms of
formal type systems. A type system for the spi-calculus has been developed by Abadi
[1] to guarantee secrecy of cryptographic protocols. Abadi and Stata [3] have used
type rules to specify and verify correctness of Java Bytecode Verier. Hennessy and
Riely [25] have introduced a type system for the language D. This work is similar
to ours (types are abstraction of process behaviours and access rights violations are
type errors), but the technical developments are quite dierent; resources are channels
and types describe permissions to use channels. Moreover, access rights are xed irre-
spectively of the localities where processes themselves are executed. In [34], the type
system of [25] has been improved for considering nets where sites can set up mali-
cious agents that do not respect the rules on the use of resources. Cardelli and Gordon
[14] have introduced a type system for mobile ambients [13] that controls the type of
the values exchanged among administrative domains (ambients) so that the commu-
nication of values cannot cause run-time faults. Volpano and Smith have developed
type systems to ensure secure information ow (noninterference) for both a sequential
procedural language [38] and for a multithreaded imperative language [39]. Boudol
[11] has used types to abstract from terms the possible sequences of interactions and
the resources used by processes. Necula [30] has introduced an approach to ensure
correctness of mobile code with respect to a xed safety policy, where code producers
provide the code with a proof of correctness that code consumers check before al-
lowing the code to execute. Vitek and Castagna [37] have proposed a language-based
approach, relying on powerful mobility and protection primitives, rather than on type
systems, for secure Internet programming. Bodei et al. [9] have proposed an alternative
R. De Nicola et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 240 (2000) 215{254 253
approach for the analysis of security and of information ow, that relies on static
analysis techniques.
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